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Introduction
Like every other scientific theory, socialist development has its 
own rationale which determines its priorities independent of the 
subjective wish of its planners. Hence the dialectical fact that 
the whole process of socio-economic development and of all objects 
develop through contradictions. A study of these contradictions and 
their correct resolution is the essence of a successful and conscious 
development. Without this scientific approach the development of 
Socialism 'will be haphazard, irrational and eventually destructive' 
(Babu 19®1 page 158).
What the above means is that, socio economic development is subject
to contradictions. The process of analysing and resolving these
contradictions is a cause-effect relationship of a dialectical
materialist nature. Therefore a correct analysis of the situation at
hand ensures a correct posing of the questions about future development,
and the latter ensures the discovery of the relevant contradictions
whose solution determines the solution of other contradictions.
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The present article will pose questions about the future development 
and strive to, explicitly and/or implicitly identify and analyse 
the contradictions in the socio-period. It should be noted that 
the objective existence of these contradictions and hence the attempts 
at National level to resolve them has generated unprecedented 
controversies. The main controversy in the opinion of the author is 
between (the advocated for) socialist orientation to development and
2the adopted neo-classical economic approach. The principle aspect in 
this controversy is the socialist orientation to development. This 
is derived from the fact that the ZANU(PF) Government has declared 
to establish a socialist state in Zimbabwe.
The key to unravelling any complex situation is to discover the starting 
point. Without this the problem will tend to get increasingly 
confused and the more complex it becomes. Hence the ’planned 
management' of the economy and delivery of social service was identified 
as such a starting point. But the prerequisite for successful 
planning is to understand in the first place that planning is a 
political action first of all not purely economic. Suffice it to say 
that to assert this.to bourgeois economists is to introduce into 
planning 'value judgements' which do not form part of their economic 
terms of reference.
An economist in their view is apolitical. He is a technical tool for 
whoever rules the country (Babu 1981 page 150). This theoretical 
position has constitute the base for the adoption of a neo-classical 
approach to resolve contradictions in the development process to 
build a socialist society. Babu in his book "African Socialism a 
Socialist Africa" clearly points out that for these economists 
(Bourgeois) there is a dividing line between politics and economics 
and the two should never be mixed up, otherwise there will be chaos. 
According to this view an economy has its own dynamism, and, given 
certain conditions, it will behave in a predictable manner. If
3anything goes wrong it is because certain rules have not been observed 
correctly or strictly.
The paper will try to clarify the meaning and implication in practice 
of this controversy from a critical analysis of the Policy of Growth 
with Equity, the Transitional Development Plan (TNDP), the Five Year 
National Development Plan (FNDP) and the nature of state economic 
participation. The hypothesis here is that the socio-economic 
actors, by and large have not developed an independent economic 
class interest in the policies they pursue, most of them being motivated 
by simple personal gains, so that their policies reflect essentially 
the same interests as the international bourgeoisie. That is, in the 
post-settler colonial epoch the 'economic struggle' has been directed 
to those areas which do not undermine the domain of private capital.
It should also be highlightened at this juncture that on the centre 
of the main controversy is the petty bourgeois ideal which is hostile 
to socialist principles. This ideal emphasise that the transition to 
socialism is possible by means of democracy in general.* Thus the 
petty bourgeois "democrats" in Zimbabwe in the 1980's have been 
distinguished by an aversion of class struggle, by their dreams of 
avoiding it, by their efforts to smooth over, to reconcile and finally
* The fundamental source of this error lies in the prejudice inherited 
from the bourgeoisie that "democracy" is something absolute and 
above classes (Lenin page H25-535).
to remove sharp corners. These 'democrats' have, therefore tried 
to avoid recognising any necessity for a whole historical period of 
transition from capitalism to socialism and they regard it as their 
duty to concort schemes for reconciling the two supposedly contending 
forces.* (Lenin page 426).
ECONOMIC POLICY OF GROWTH WITH EQUITY: RELEVANCE TO THE 1980 DECADE 
Introduction
With the notion and conviction that the attainment of political 
independence constituted only a qualitative step in the battle for 
national independence, to institutionalise the struggle for economic 
emancipation was a logical move. Hence in February of 1981 Growth with 
Equity an Economic Policy Statement was effected. This seemed to be 
the needed radical stride towards uncovering the appropriate 
technology to spearhead the Zimbabwean proletariat in the quest to 
satisfy thier multi-dimensional demands. Along the same line the 
Transitional National Development Plan was drafted followed three 
years later by the first Five Year National Development Plan.
It is important, therefore in an article of this nature to briefly make 
a critical evaluation of the relevance of the Policy statement to the 
1980 decade and the character of the plans which correspond to the 
same time framework.
* Alliance of the workers and peasants on the one hand and the petty 
bourgeoisie, local and international bourgeoisie on the other. .
Policy Statement: The Underlying Methodological Foundation 
The Policy statement has been objective in recognising the basic 
characteristics of the past and still prevailing socio-economic order 
in Zimbabwe. However the determination thereof to undertake a vigorous 
programme for the development of the country and, within it, to pursue 
and implement policies based on the socialist, egalitarian and 
democratic principles in conditions of rapid economic growth, full . 
employment, price stability, dynamic efficiency'in resource allocation 
and an equitable distribution of the ensuring benefits (Policy 
Statement Feb. 1981 page 1) has been based on the theoretical and 
subjective assumptions of the dynamics of a capitalist system.
The analysis of the inherited capitalist process was evidently, 
approached not from the production geneology but from a neo-colonial 
production function stand point. Efficiency was presupposed, and 
inevitably this produced the mistake of looking at the reality of 
inherited economy in an inappropriately ’optimistic’ fashion. A 
firm grasp of the inorganic interlinkages within the capitalist economic 
structure and the extent and magnitude of its impact in the society 
should have constituted the basis of the Policy Statement.
It also goes without saying that the period in which the policy was 
drafted and promulgated should have had influence on the outcome of the 
policy statement. The policy of reconciliation which in itself is a 
political instrument was extended to the ideological-cum-economic 
struggle. This should have been quite a deliberate step or an
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ignorance of the incompatibility and antagonisms between labour and
''Under capitalist conditions.
The philosophy of reconciling labour and capital was captured as follows:
"Government is determined to forge ahead with the task of 
building a progressive, non-racial and egalitarian society 
which draws on the energies and abilities of all its people, 
without regard for their race or creed. However, the 
restructuring of economic and social framework of our 
society is an absolutely essential and imperative 
economic ingredient of the policy of reconciliation if that 
poliey is to result in gennuine and durable peace in our 
country and is to be conducive to economic development 
and prosperity for all our people." (Policy Statement 
1981 page 1-2).
This blanket approach accorded well with the bourgeois neo-calssical 
perspective. A considerable degree of ellecticism is implicitly shown in the 
objectives of ranked priority and thus phase them over space and time 
e.g. as short, medium and long term programmes. Such an exercise 
should have brought out the need for accountability by the social 
actors to the masses of workers and peasants. Thus the legitimacy of 
the actors could have been under close scrutiny and control curbing 
laxity which is now crippling the attainment of the laid down objectives.
An insight into the the structural interaction of objective one (i) and 
four (iv) stated below could present an interesting scenario with regard 
to the workings of the Zimbabwean revolution towards socialist 
democracy and the relevance of the policy to the 1980's.
The objectives are put as follows:
(i) establish progressively a society founded on socialist
7democratic and egalitarian principles which are inherent 
in the policies and measures enunciated herein. And to 
(iv) end imperialist exploitation, and achieve greater and more
equitable degree of ownership of natural resources including 
land, promote participation in the ownership of, a significant 
portion of the economy by nationals and the state (ibid page 2).
The above objectives are central to the development towards a socialist 
democracy. But this depends on the point and level of interaction 
between the progressive establishment of a democratic socialist society 
and the rate at which the society can dissentangle itself from 
imperialist exploitation. Currently the imperialist variable has been 
endogenised so much so that it cannot be ignored when internal 
processes and actors are analysed. The endogenisation of this 
supposedly external factor has been reinforced by the production 
function approach which is the underlying methodology to the policy 
statement.
If this is anything to go by then the first objective is still an 
aspiration which has not yet found its on way into the Zimbabwean 
Society. The second (according to the layout above) has consolidated 
its position occupying a central place in the whole debate on the 
relationship between international capital and its financing of 
socialism. The interaction point therefore has been shifted to 
the structural level and it becomes crystal clear that the socialist 
element of the revolution has been derailed.
8But, nonetheless, the first objective is of a long term character and 
expresses the hisotircal and final goal of the revolution. Hence, 
here the structural friction between objective four (iv) above which 
is of short to medium term character and objective one (i). The 
realisation of objective four (iv) provide the basis on which one 
evolve and expand. This structural conflict therefore reflect the 
level and depth of the contradiction in the development process.
But eventually the more rooted capitalist can tilt the scale in
its favour if neo-classical economic methods/approach remain dominant.
Policy Statement and the National Tasks
To further explicate the above idea the policy statement, on page 3,
announced the urgent national tasks as:
(i) to complete the programme of resettlement and rehabilitation of 
combatants and of all people displaced during the war.
(ii) to complete the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged economic 
and social infrasturcture and create a sound spring-board for 
future growth and development.
One would suppose that the tasks have been put. in their order of priority 
or urgency. The major issue that follows relates to the degree of 
responsiveness and interconnectedness, of the respective tasks to the 
logic of capital. Progress in the execution of each one of the above 
tasks is conditioned by the above mentioned relationship. To a greater 
extend the level of execution (or lack of it) of the tasks would 
illustrate the strength and centrality of the capitalist logic in
9Zimbabwe and the level of its international connections, as opposed 
to the existence of a base for equitable growth.
The Reconstruction Process
One significant development related to public expenditure was the
rapid expansion of the social sectors....  The reconstructing programme
was completed in record time - long before the end of the TNDP period, 
infrastructural development, notably road construction and water 
development programmes progressed as planned. (FNDP page 1).
Reconstruction of the economic and social infrasturcture was welcomed
by all sectors in the society. Economically reconstruction meant
that the state had a supportive role to the development of capitalism.
However, the benefits to the peasants from this exercise was minimal.
Furthermore, reconstuction only facilitated the export of agricultural
goods to the industrial sector. Evidently it is shown that a
retrogressive relationship between the industrial sector and peasant
agriculture does not exist. Hence the inorganic relations that
existed and continue to exist between the two sectors. The solution 
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to this contradiction therefore lies with the development of 
interlinkages between these two sectors based on growth. Therefore 
initiatives which bring about growth with the aim to foster organic 
links between industry and agriculture are the economic demand of the 
time.
Socially the point is clear as to what benefits each social sector 
receive from reconstruction exercise. Provision of services which had
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been cut-off by a political struggle had the blessing of all.
While this was of social significance to the peasants who had been 
involved in the political process, the capitalist sector found it 
to be the departing point as to what is political and how distanced 
from politics the sector should be. This attitude which separates 
politics from economics is the cornerstone to the doctrine of apolitics 
professed by the private sector, hence the dominance of technicism.
This was meant to. position the state as the sole representative of the 
nation in 'political' and 'social' affairs and equi-distantly - the 
private sector hijack the economic undertakings and consolidate its 
internal links and avoid as much as possible direct conflict and 
antagonism with and technically pressurise the state to bow to 
socio-economic demands and transformation measures recommended by the 
capitalist economic block.
Resettlement Exercise
On the other hand the resettlement of the landless, combatants and of 
all the people displaced during the war covertly embodied political 
connotations. Land and its distribution between the peasant and the 
capitalist commercial farmers was at the centre of the political 
struggle. The conquest in 1890 of the entire territory by the British 
South Africa.Company (BSAC), and the consequent distribution of 
land which was based on nothing else but race and capitalist thirst 
for accummulation reflects the political nature of this exercise.
Here capitalism based on a bankrupt nation of race superiority 
reinforced itself and was eventually identified with fertile and 
adequately watered land, proximity to market and transport infrastructure
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First Five Year National Development Plan (FNDP) show that the 
Transitional Development Plan (TNDP) fell far short of resettling 
162 000 families as had been envisaged in that only one fifth of 
the target was achieved (FNDP page 1). The amount of opposition to 
the resettlement programme is evident from the antagonistic relations 
between the capitalist sector and the objectives of the state.
Capitalism did not only distance itself from the programme which 
is political but worked against its implementation, productivity 
of the resettled families, environmental destruction and the role of 
the capitalist sector as the ’golden goose' were/are used to counter 
progress in this area. Financial constraints had their share.
Resettlement of the landless, combatants and the people displaced by 
the war was a revision of the land distribution patterns used by the 
previous successive racial regimes. The idea was to create economic 
opportunities for the landless,.incorporate the combatants in 
productive undertakings, and all in all, raise the productivity of 
land and the living standards of the people. This could not be done 
without affecting the capitalist sector of the agricultural economy. 
Hence the resistence from this sector and the support rendered to 
this stance by external financial sources. •
Employment creation and the eradication of the squatting problem (judged 
from the situation inherited at independence) implicitly constituted 
the major objectives of the resettlement programme. That is, while 
the programme is a political programme it had economic and social 
goals. Failing to create employment and solving the squatting issue
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in whatever form it manifests (squatting is also increased by the rate 
of unemployment) is a positive condition reinforcing the bargaining 
strength of the capitalist sector, both agricultural and industiral, 
for reduced wages as a prerequisite for employment creation; to dismiss 
"lazy" workers and employ "competent" workers and even for the scrapping 
of some progressive legislations in favour of the repressive 
pre-independence legislations.
The; solution to the resettlement programme is - questionable as long as 
the socialist element of the revolution is relegated to the margin by 
the strength of the internal capitalist logic and its external 
connections. As a reminder to revolutionaries in 1919 Lenin wrote that 
the class of exploiters, the landowners and capitalists has not 
disappeared arid cannot disappear all at once under the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. The exploiters have been smashed but not destroyed. 
They still have an international base in the form of international 
capital, of which they are a branch. They still retain means of 
production in part, they still have money,' they still have vast 
social connections. Because they have been defeated, the energy 
of their resistance has increased a hunderd and a thousand fold.
The "art" of state, military and economic administration gives them 
a superiority and a very great superiority, so that their importance 
is incomparably greater than their numerical proposition of the 
population. The class struggle waged by the over-thrown exploiters 
against the victorious vanguard of the exploited, i.e. the proletariat, 
has became incomparably bitter. And it cannot be otherwise in the 
case of a revolution, unless this concept is replaced (as it is by
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all the heroes of the second international) by reformist illusions.
(Lenin page. ^33)-
PLANKING OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
Introduction
The analysis pursued in the first section only provides an alternative 
scenario. It can be concluded that the Policy statement has had 
minimum relevance and not of practical value to the 1980's in so 
far as the underlying objectives are concerned. While the policy 
statement acknowledged that over the years (pre-independence years) 
the economy failed to absorb the growing labour force with consequent 
high and unacceptable levels of unemployment and underemployment* it 
sets an average rate of growth for the same economic structures to 
achieve a balanced and equitable growth. The statement reads:
"In order to achieve balanced and equitable growth and 
inorder for the economy to create sufficient levels of 
employment to absorb a rapidly growing labour force it 
will be necessary for the economy to grow at an annual 
average rate of at least 8 percent in real terms."
To achieve the eight (8) percent annual rate of growth the statement 
view it 'necessary to undertake a serious national exercise for 
mobilisation of economic, financial, social and manpower resources of 
Zimbabwe organised and co-ordinated through the planning process *
* This was in part a product of population pressure and the adoption of 
inappropriate economic and industrial policies of previous governments 
claims the statement.
(Economic Policy Statement page 3)- Restructuring of the economy 
is understood here as a long term programme. This puts a question 
mark on the seriousness of the mobilisation of socio-economic, 
financial and manpower resources as a national exercise.
But are the economic conditions for planning created in-order to 
facilitate the organisation and co-ordination of the mobilisation 
process? How does the document envisage to effect the process? Or 
is Planning the solution to all the problems covered in this 
document or experienced in Zimbabwe? A critical analysis of the 
TNDP and FNDP should provide some tangible answers to the questions 
raised above.
Transitional Development Plan (1982-1985
The TNDP has received its share of positive and negative critics. To 
make a solid contribution to the criticisms.the production geneology 
and production function dichotomy should be once more raised in this 
section. In other words this refers to, on the one hand, a surgical 
analysis of the economy and on the other, a presupposition of 
efficient functioning of the economy respectively.
It is safe to say that the two define a methodological issue crippling 
planning as a method of management. Efficient operation of the inherited 
economy was presupposed at independence and on.this premise was 
formulated the Policy statement and the plans thereof (TNDP, FNDP).
The fact that processes are connected vertically, or they are 
^operated in parallel with each other, was completely ignored, as is
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reflected by the following analysis.
The first two years of independence brought with them a brief 
period of boom in the economy. This boom was directly related to 
a number of factors.
- The end of the war
- The opening up of rural areas to normal economic activity
- The minimum wages
- The fact that local manufacturing could take up the expansion in 
demand without new capital investment because it was in 1980 
operating at less than 60% capacity
- The short-term ’benefits' of international reconstruction aid. 
(Raftopoulos 1988 page 15).
The interplay between these factors has not been accounted for. The 
more than forty percent under-utilised capacity reflected mainly 
the effects of the international sanctions on the Smith Regime, and 
the escalation of the armed struggle, among others. But the fact 
remains that the hundred percent installed capacity was to serve • 
the minority Europeans; a handful of the African community and export 
markets. The operational capacity (60%) at independence therefore 
meant that the number of beneficiaries was even reduced from the 
number whose needs could be satisfied by the targeted 100 percent 
capacity.
The remaining factors (listed above) illustrate the increase in 
global demand. If all these factors could be drawn into the game then
the internal structural composition of the economy has to change to 
meet the growing demand. But as a substitute to growth and structural 
changes socialist propaganda dominated.the theoretical sections of the 
TNDP.
There existed structural incompatibilities between the growing 
demand and the ill (not diagnosed) economic structure,..... but all 
embroiled in the same 'comforting socialist strategy1 as shown in the
document.
While the inherited economy/with its institutions, and 
infrastructures has in the past served a minority, it 
would be simplistic and indeed, naive to suggest that 
it should, therefore, be destroyed in order to make.a 
fresh start. The challenge lies in building upon and 
developing on what was inherited, modifying, expanding 
and where necessary, radically changing structures and 
institutions inorder to maximise benefits from economic 
growth and.development to Zimbabweans as a whole.. (TNDP 
page 1).
The logic is quite simple, in that 'the inherited economy with its 
institutions and infrastructure' which.had in the past served a 
minority, could not be expected to, after 1980, serve 7-5 million 
Zimbabweans, let alone growth with equity. But what seems to be 
'simplistic and naive’ is the suggestion that growth with equity 
could be achieved by 'building upon and developing institutions, 
modifying, expanding and where necessary, radically changing structures 
and institutions'. However, it is like builjding a tower on a large 
ant-hill.
The prescription is a combination of petty-bourgeois reformism and neo-
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classical economism. The reaction,to exogenous variables by this 
combination is total and final, and anything to do with the endogenous 
factors (determination of actors, processes and the nature of the 
relationship) is left to the miracles of market ’efficiency i.e. free 
interplay of market forces.
Raftopolous has concurred with the above, when he wrote that in the years 
after 1981, when the plan turned to be no plan at all, the reasons 
for the failure were not focussed on the internal social relations of 
our society, but centred almost solely on the recession and the 
drought i.e. the external and natural factors. (Raftopolous 1988, page 
16).
The FNDP in turn could not escape this problem confronted by the 
TNDP as it was analysed above. The problem is rooted in the Policy 
statement document on which the two plans have been formulated.
First Five Year National Development?- Plan (1986-1990): An Insight 
Th6 investment pattern and/or behaviour after independence depicts the 
level at which the economy responded to the growing demand of the time. 
Gross fixed capital formation in real terms increased by 20.0% and 
37.0% in 1980 and 1981 respectively (FNDP page 5). Investments then 
declined significantly during most of the three year plan period. By 
1985 the volume of investments in fixed capital was one fifth below its 
1982 level.
The decline in investment is one of the main reasons for lack of
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growth in the economy and in employment opportunities over the plan 
period (Ibid). It follows, therefore, that investments in the 
productive sectors is the major source of growth and in turn the growth 
within this sectors generates surplus income for investment. And 
using the increment for rapidly generating economic growth involves 
not using it to increase consumption for the time being. But to postpone 
raising consumption here and now in order to be able to raise it 
more rapidly later is a different thing from reducing consumption here 
and now which defeatist view see as the only possibility (Maurice 
Dobb 1963 page 42).
The decline in productive sector investments during the TNDP was therefore
accompanied by an average annual decline in employment in these
sectors of -1.2%. However, in the social sectors employment continued
to grow at the rate of 2.9% annually during the same period. This
was inevitable as it was seen to be in line with the 'socialist'
propaganda of petty-bourgeois origin which predominated the TNDP
Plan document. FNDP noted that the situation presented above was one
of the most destabilising factors in the economy since expenditure on
social sectors increased during a period when the economy was not
generating additional wealth (FNDP page 5). No merits can be
accorded to the document for noting this abnormality for the
concequence of the adopted strategy was obvious. Has the FNDP
addressed this issue? Or is the prevailing management practices in
both private and public sector compatible with the Plan objectives?
Other academic circles profess that nationalisation alone would
provide the solution to-the Zimbabwean crisis. Is this the needed 
socialist thrust?
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The question of ownership obviously can not be omitted in this 
article. This is so amid debate on whether the state ownership of 
the means of production is a condition for growth or not. At this 
juncture the debate in Zimbabwe should have been expected to go beyond 
this vicious circle, to more specific target areas of how can the 
economy respond to the demand of the time which turn-out to be more 
than demand but crisis. An insight into the threads that link both 
the private and public enterprises to State Management (Plan)should 
provide the answer to the needed relationship between the expansion 
of State sector and norms which govern the socialist development.
Private Sector Economic Management
The private sector economy could not exist if there were no 
corresponding methods of managing it. It is based on such laws that 
strive for ’economic efficiency' as the basis for accummulation.
Prices are adjusted according to excess demand and quantities according 
to excess profits, i.e. where Demand > Supply of a certain good its 
price is raised and vice versa. When excess profits obtained from a 
good are positive, the output of that good will be expanded (or 
contracted where the reverse holds). This in itself shows that the 
economic efficiency (a sacred category) under capitalism is not 
synonymous to economic growth as the neo-classical would want many a 
scholar to believe.
The above sounds more classical than the Zimbabwean case but in 
practice the same is taking place at both the enterprise and national
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level. Internal policies of individual enterprises are determined 
by non other than the drive to maximise profits, even in conditions 
where price mark-ups are set by the relevant authorities.
An analysis of the management of working capital would provide an 
insight into the nature of cpitalist management in Zimbabwe. The 
management of working capital is either aggressive (less working 
capital) or conservative (more working capital). These are proxies 
for management risk aversion. Another proposition with respect to 
risk aversion can be stated: aggressive working capital management 
leads normally to higher return on investment (R.O.I.) conservative 
management, of working capital on the other hand normally leads to 
lower returns on investment (Shabalala 1987 page 6). The individual 
capitalist is the main actor in this game whose economic wisdom 
does not go beyond the market and/or would be tested in the market.
In a study of the private sector management methods, Shabalala(Lecturer 
U.Z. Department of Business Studies) provided relevant information 
on the isubject of working capital and its management by big private 
enterprises in Zimbabwe. The information reveals that the 
responsibility for establishing management policy for working 
capital rest with the top management. The distribution of primary 
responsibility for the management of working capital components 
depicts the importance of inventory as a component of working capital 
and hence the involvement of the management appex.
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The Distribution of Primary Responsibility for the Management of 
Working Capital Components
Percentage Responses
MD GM CE FC FM T O-SP
(a) Cash 0 0 0 59 32 0 9
(b) Marketable Securities 9 0 5 27 18 0 0
(c) A/C Receivable Debtors 9 5 0 41 27 0 18
(d) Inventory A/C Payable 23 14 14 36 14 0 9
(e) Creditors 0 5 0 .59 32 0 - 15









The above statistical information shows that the responsibility of 
managing the inventory component is distributed fairly among all the 
management categories except the Treasurer. The Managing Directors 
and Financial Controllers feature prominently in this regard with 
23 percent and 36 percent respectively. This can be v iewed in light 
.with, the involvement of these two categories in the establishment of 
management policy for working capital. They account for 36 percent
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and 23 percent respectively.
Suppose that information on the criteria used in evaluating proposed 
changes in the inventory policy is added to the analysis above then 
the origin of the importance of inventory as a component of working 
capital could be traced.
Criteria Used in Evaluating Proposed Changes in Inventory Policy 
Criterion Rank Percentage
1 2 ‘ 3
(a) 'Effect on the level of inventory 23 23 5
(b) Effects on inventory cost 1U 9 27
(c) Effect on firm’s profit 27 18 0
(d) Effect on return on investment 9 1lJ 1U
(e) Effect on Marketing Effectiveness 18 23 27
(f) Other 5 0 0
The source of importance of inventory is clearly shown in the table 
above. The data illustrate that any changes in the inventory policy 
rests on (a) its effects on the inventory cost (b); effects on firm's 
profits (c) and effect on Marketing effectiveness. These three 
criterias strongly reinforce each other in the day to day operation 
of the firm with regard to the size of the lote, quality of products, 
response to the market by the firm etc.
In as much as the private companies would want to work for the common
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good, that is, taking social indicators into their plan in accordance 
with the state plan objectives, their internal setting which is only 
a mechanism to respond in one way or the other to the anarchy of the 
market, forces them to remain hostile to anything which does not offer 
the opportunity to get the expected margin of profit and therefore 
maintain economic efficiency. That is, in Zimbabwe, where initiative 
in investment and development rests with private firms and individuals 
with their eyes upon markets and profits margin, the mere existence 
of a plan on paper means remarkably little.
Without the means of implementing the plan targets, they remain pious 
hopes that are unrealised in practice. The state may be able to 
influence the situation in various ways: through monetary policy, 
taxation and a few controls, but these are essentially indirect 
instruments, and in the circumstances of Zimbabwe and its typically 
capitalist base (and the isolation of public sector investment) they 
have proved to be weak and brittle instruments: at that.
Public Sector Economic Management
The public sector on the other hand, though small, co-exist with the 
private sector. The unchanged methods of management however do not 
correspond to the political demands of a nation whose future lies 
on the sector's growth. Public enterprises have remained strictly 
'business' organisations. This makes their responsiveness to 
government policies impossible as they are not directly linked to the 
same policies.
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Strange as It may seem, the situation is as presented above in the 
case of state-owned enterprises. In them state property becomes a 
’mere judicial fiction' (POPOV 1984 page 50). Public enterprises 
enjoy practically the same autonomy with regard to the state as 
private ones. They are subject to the same laws of the free market, 
whereby their microplans are fomulated individually by each 
enterprise and regulated only indirectly through the price 
mechanism, without direct or conscious mutual adjustments. This 
management system runs counter to the main aims proclaimed in the 
state plan.
On the other hand centralisation of planning for public sector enterprise 
enhance the cohesiveness of the public sector as opposed to the 
current isolation of these production units. A centralised 
planning Authority or a Holding Company in the Zimbabwe Development 
Corporation (EDG) should be tasked with the formation of a 
centralised and comprehensive public sector plan, monitor and control 
the implementation of the plan and develop the concept of 
accountability. In other words each unit of production is controlled 
through the desaggregated norms of consumption (consumption rates).
But the units of production also have to calculate their individual 
norms of consumption which can be above or below the centrally 
calculated rates. These being considered whenever central planning 
authorities are calculating the central rates.
This is in line with the conscious regulation of the public sector.
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The process calls for the establishment of the public sector internal 
links co-ordinated at the centre. The influence of the public 
sector on the economy as a whole could then be calculated and its 
growth consciously focussed from a scientific basis. The response of 
the sector to external factors is made easy to detect and evaluate 
the impact on the internal interweaving. From this perspective the 
public sector acquires the properties which allow it to be more 
related to government policy than in the current situation and 
responsive to public demand.
State ownership of the means of production alone therefore does not 
imply balanced growth and equitable distribution, nor does it mean 
transformation towards socialism. Nationalisation therefore is a 
means through which state productive sector is expanded . Its combination with 
a comprehensive planning system is the centre of a sustained growth.
In Zimbabwe currently the inherent contradiction to the economy is the 
one between the capitalist economic base and management methods which 
are unchanged (particularly in the public sector) and the conditions 
and^requirements of the Zimbabwe society. The expansion rate of 
this sector cannot be ascertained and the interlinks (forward and 
backwards) within the public sector and between this and the whole economy 
cannot be identified. Information is not co-ordinated to facilitate 
this exercise although growth of the sector has been a preoccupation 
of the policy-makers.
Transformation Towards Socialism: Strategies
Objective (a), of the FNDP on transformation and control of the 
economy and economic expansion rules out outright nationalisation of 
the private enterprises as a means of public sector economy. This 
is explicitly illustrated by the following break-down of the methods 
through which the objective would be achieved:
(i) Establishment by the state of new enterprises in strategic 
industries.
(ii) State participation in existing strategic enterprises with the 
role of the state gradually increasing until majority or full 
ownership is attained by the state.
(iii) Joint ventures between the state and private capital on terms 
which allow for eventual ownership and control by the state.
(iv) Establishment of co-operative ventures in industry, commerce, 
trade and agriculture as well as participation of local 
authorities in the economy.
(v) Workers education in management, technical skills and ideology 
in order to increase efficiency of workers and their ability to 
participate in running of enterprises as well as increase their 
ideological consciousness; and
(vi) encouragement and acceptance of private local and foreign
investment on terms conducive to or consistent with socialist 
transformation. (FNDP page 1^).
The new ingredient to the FNDP is the task (for the) expansion of the 
state sector through direct investment in new project, joint ventures
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and through acquiring of shares in ’key’ industries. Public sector 
Investment Programme (PSIP) is the current major means at the disposal 
of the state to achieve its objective. As statistically shown PSIP 
accounts for 63% of the total of $7 126 million (Gross Fixed Capital) 
required to attain and sustain the planned annual growth in GDP of 
5.1% during the Plan period.
A break-down of.the above (Gross Fixed Capital) figure provides an 
insight into the nature of the expansion programme. The plan 
document (FNDP Vol 1) stress that 'one of the main aspects of 
the investment strategy is that, in addition to the PSIP’.5 large size 
in total investment, about one third of the PSIP will be allocated to 
the development sectors (FNDP page 1.4) - About $1 552 million as 
opposed to 1 808 million by the private sector is going to be 
invested in the three productive sectors namely, agriculture, mining 
and quarrying and the manufacturing sector.
Of the total productive sector investments ($1 552 million) more than 
half. ($880 million) is accounted for by agriculture. On the other hand 
the private sector has only allocated $118 million or 7% of their 
productive investments into agricutlure. The rest ($1 690 million) 
has been distributed between mining and manufacturing sectors.
The government therefore sees in agricutlural development the cornerstone 
for achieving growth arid socialist transformation and development. This
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Is viewed as the basis of creating large amounts of productive 
employment and reduce the drift of rural labour to urban centres 
(Rebuilding Zimbabwe page 61). Still the thrust in this regard 
concentrates on infrastructural projects as shown in the second 
volume of the Plan. Of the total 880 million allocated to 
agricutlure only $33,75 million,is the cumulative capital expenditure 
for state farms, over the five year period. In relative terms the 
amount represent a 4 percent of agriculture vote.
State farms should be ideally the nuclei of development in v 
agriculture and rural,areas. Their strategic distribution in the 
districts and provinces and the creation of interaction possibilities 
with the communal areas and resettlement schemes would motivate the 
economic opportunities of these areas. The consequent development 
of agro-industries (specialised) at state farms create markets for 
the local peasantry and small-scale commercial farmers. Technical 
knowledge could easily be imparted from the state farms, hence 
mobilisation of the peasantry to form co-operatives and produce at 
a large-scale for a reliable state market.
Investing in scattered infrastructural projects in itself does not 
increase the production for future development or creation of 
employment but develops the infrastructure for those who can use them 
The role of the state thus remains in supportive role to those who 
can exploit the infrastructure. The distribution of resource from 
the central to local levels and their consequent redistribution at 
this level in most case benefit those who have the economic capacity
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to make use of these resources. The idea here should be that of 
taking the central (state) economic capacities to the local levels 
to enhance the economic capacities at these level’s, in a controlled, 
supervised and systematic manner. This strategy would inject growth 
in the agriculture sector, create employment and foster links between 
industry and agriculture and also work towards the elimination of 
antagonism between town and country.
The state sector of the national economy should represent a solid 
material base for planning. In other words effective planning and the 
development of state sector are indissolubly linked. The FNDP (as 
it stands) implicitly points to the absence of state control over the 
national economy, the continuing dependence on imperialism and the 
absence of control over the state itself on the part of working people, 
hence the existence of a fragmented and inadequate statistical information 
and centralised data bank.
i ' i - r - - - plan for the public sector (with a legal character), the principle
^  *ihSling out 'the main link' and its reinforcing^and solid
 ^****** ions with other linking (socio-economic) threads; the combination
- - -
■■.-.*** annual and the medium plans (not on paper but in practice)
and complete control over the fulfillment of the 
the central level are the missing elements of ranked 
in the FNDP.
w -  investment Programme (PSIP) has an important
\:x . ***• Achievement of most macro-economic plan targets and
stru ct nv>al change. It should therefore not only be
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drafted la annual amounts allocated to the different ministries but 
should also encompass central projects and priorities of structural 
changes and development. In this way the PSIP could be developed 
to become a decisive instrument for the implementation of the 
urgently needed industrialisation (Wittich 1984). The challenge to 
the PSIP can then be explained by the level of state participation 
in the economy. The following section, therefore present a brief and 
descriptive analysis of the role of the state economic enterprises 
which should provide the needed understanding of the nature of state 
participation in the economy.
STATE ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION: ROLE OF STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN
THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS
Introduction
The last two sections of the article have analysed the policy of 
Growth with Equity, the CTNDP) and the (FNDP). In this section 
therefore attention is accorded to the concrete participation of 
the state in the economy. This is against the background that the 
objectives set in the Policy and in the two plans mentioned herein 
presuppose an active role by the state in developing an organic 
technical and material base for socialist development.
State participation in the economy illustrates the need to establish 
a socialist state in Zimbabwe as a means to redress the imbalances 
created by decades of settler colonialist and private capital domination. 
With this in mind therefore it becomes obvious from a scientific 
‘understanding of the inerited economy that the state economic sector 
would strive to foster links between different sectors of the
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economy, inject growth, create employment as well as raise the 
standards of living of the workers and peasants.
It has been noted in the preceeding sections that the need for growth 
is urgent. This is reflected by the discrepancy between the currently 
installed socio-economic capacity and the level of socio-economic needs 
(Demand) or requirements of the broad masses.
In analysing the active role of the state in the economy, this article 
therefore will not analyse sector by sector (sectors, which comprise 
the public sphere of activity) but will concentrate on the three 
productive sectors which are Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), 
Zimbabwe Minining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and Agriculture a n d . 
Rural Development (ARDA). This does not necessarily mean that the 
distribution and service sectors are less important. The thrust 
originates from the focus of the section; to explicate the approach to 
economic growth as the source of income for future growth (on which 
equitable distribution could be based).
At independence, the elected ZANU (PF) government assumed responsibility 
and control of all the public economic structures (Public State apparatus) 
as they were left by the Smith Regime. These were mostly parastatals, 
specialising in the privision of services and marketing facilities.
The range of activities in the various categories of parastatals 
included were Transport, Marketing, Finance, Energy, Agricutlure and 
Rural Devleopment and Industrial Development.
After announcing the policy of growth with equity (February 1981) 
the government had to be seen to be biding by the demands of the 
proclaimed plicy. Direct action was taken. This action involved 
initiatives to acquire foreign interests in 'Key Productive' areas 
of the economy and to take over marketing of minerals and fuel.
The major initiatives have thus been the following: the purchase of 
43% shares in Zimbabwe Newspapers from South African interests 
with Nigerian Capital; the purchase of a 61% share (South African) 
Zimbank; the 47% share in the newly formed Bank of Credit and 
Commerce; the purchase of 42.6% international controlling interest 
in CAPS; 40% equity share in Anglo America's Wankie Colliery Company; 
the establishment of the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe to procure 
fuel for the country from external sources; the purchase of book seller 
and stationers, Kingstons by the mass media and 49% shares in ZISCO 
Stoneman 984, Page 294)
At the same time the Zimbabwean Government, through the productive 
parastatals (stream lined according to special fields of activities), 
has tasked itself to venture into the productive sectors which were 
mainly the domain of the private sector so as to comply forth with 
the development objectives outlined in the policy. The inherited 
productive institutions like ARDA and IDC had to be restructured 
in one way or the other so as to perform this mammoth task.
This section, therefore is an attempt to briefly assess the role of 
the state in economic development since 1980. An analysis of the 
strategies adopted by the state enterprises in their intervention in
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the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors should be 
highlightened.
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
IDC was established by the Act (Chapter 286) in 1963- At independence 
IDC became the Ministry of Industry and Technology's instrument for 
'National development, creation and preservation of jobs and the
i 'ransfer of new technology into the country, utilisation of local 
resources, saving foreign currency through import substitution and 
export promotion'. (Government of Zimbabwe 1980-1985 page 9).
Since its formation (1963) the IDC facilitated the development of state 
capitalism and corporatism.
An entry point into an analysis of the role and strategies adopted by 
IDC can be provided by the table below.
The table is a synthesis of the IDC investments for the years 1981,
1984 and 1987, at 30th June.* It illustrates the specific weight of 
each industry (in which the IDC has investments) in the total IDC 
investments per given year. The information has been abstracted from 
the corresponding IDC annual reports.
* These years were adopted because 1981 provide the needed 
information i.e. only a year into independence. In 1984 the 
government had acquired the remaining 20% private shares in 
IDC and 1987 is the year in which the latest information is 
available.
Tabled Investraesafcs of 30th June, V ;?o7 oy ua j/-rrov
Industry 1981 1984 1987
$ ’000 % $ ’000 % . $ ’000 %
Chemical • 199 0.76 193 0.52 809 1.69
Clothing 366 .1.40 . 971 2.59 1 099 2.31
ir Electrical and Electricty 64 0.24 77 0.21 190 0.40
: Engineering 568 2.17 670 1 •?? 4 984 10.48
- Film 425 1.63 376 • 1.00 384 0.81
Financial Services 2 147 8.21 771 2.06 1 102 2.32
Hotel 28 0.11, ... 1- - -
Industrial Property 72 0.28 37 0.09 - -
Metal Products 1 147 4.39 7 940 21.20 10 062 21.15
Mining . 12 654 ,48.40 11 732 31-32 2 835 5.96
Motor Assembly- 4 641 17.75 . 6 720 . 17.95 4 541 9.54
Non-Metalic Mineral Products 494 3.61 2 794 7.46 3 471- 7.30
Quarrying 14 0.05. 77 0.21 24 0.05
Spinning, Weaving, Knitting 
& tining of textiles 2 747 '10151 3 945 10.53 4 179 8.78
Tanning and manufacture of
Leather goods 94 0.36 • 30 0.08 - -
Transport 34 0.13 21 0.05 - - ■
Furniture - - 950 2.54 "756 1.56
Pencils - ■ - 153 0.41 183 0.58
Glassware - - - - 9 663 20.31
Grain bags 3 270 6.87
Pulp & paper 30 0.06
26 955 100 37 458 100 47 576 100
Source: IDC Annual Reports
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Table 1 Indicate that almost half (*18.40%) of IDC investments were 
concentrated in the mining sector. According to the Capital StocK 
1983:90% of the mining capital was In the hands of transnational 
capital, and 10% was owned by private (local) capital. In other words 
IDC Investments in this regard were insignificant. It can be supposed 
that its mining interests were in those areas where operational risk 
level is high.
Motor Assembly with 17-75% constitute the second single largest 
investment in 1981. Apparently the manufacturing sector was mainly 
left to the private sector.
In 1984 a remarkeable shift in the structure of sectoral level of 
investment was witnessed. Although mining remained the sector with 
the single largest investment (3 1% of the total investments), metal 
products with 21% had surpassed Motor Assembly (17-94%). The reduction 
in the proportion of mining investments was mainly attributed to the 
formation of Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC). On 14 
March, 1984 ZMDC acquired 100% of the A voting shares of the Mining 
Promotion Corporation (Private)Ltd from IDC; a step in rationalising its 
operations.
The acquisation of IDC mining interests by ZMDC generated internal 
movement of capital from one industry to another without necessarily 
raising the volume of investments. Between 1981 and 1984, Furniture 
and pencil production feature as the new production lines.
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A snore or less even distribution of investments across lines of 
production was apparent in 1987- Metal products (21.15%), glassware 
(20.01%), Engineering (10.48%), Motor Assembly (9-54%), Spinning 
Weaving, Knitting and the tining of textiles (8.78) and Non-Metalic 
mineral products (7-30%) topped the rank. Chemicals (1.69%),
Electrical and electric (0.40%) remained at the bottom of the 
investment ladder. Mining was further displaced.
Increments in the total volume of investments from $26 144 million in 
1981 to $37 ^58 million (1984) and $47 576 million (1987) are testimony 
of the injection of new capital. This means an element of expansion 
of state participation in industry occurred during the period from 
1980 to 1987. But as expansion does not necessarily mean growth of 
the national productive sector, the modalities under which this 
expansion took place have to be analysed.
A close observation of the investment strategy of the IDC reveals that 
since 1980 the amount invested was spent mostly in rescuing companies 
experiencing survival problems allegedly caused by world recession ana 
the drought which devastated agriculture in particular and consequently 
the manufacturing industry. Government rescue of companies in trouble 
was therefore aimed at assisting in keeping those in employment.
Nevertheless, the downward trend in the level of those employed could 
not be avoided. If keeping those in employment was/is still a major 
problem it appears then that it is just impossible to do much about the
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unemployed. The constraints impeding job creation are however 
referred to in officials documents as the cuts in foreign currency, 
allocations, drought, increased cost of production, and decreased 
domestic demand.
It is against this background that this article argues that employment 
creation and growth have been sacrified in the name of preserving jobs, 
import substitution and saving foreign currency. But despite the 
adopted strategy the IDC is trapped in a vicious circle. As the 
able bodied population increases and the capacity to generate new 
employment is not existent there is more demand on the little resources 
already in production. Thus the circle of unemployment would reproduce 
itself even at more intensified levels.
The acquisation of minority shares in different private enterprises 
was/is the ’adopted’ investment strategy. This is confirmed in the 
Directors’ Report (IDC Annual Reports) which explains clearly that 
"all investments and income therefrom are in- terms of Section 49b) 
of the Corporation’s enabling Act (Chapter 286) as amended). There 
were no investments or income under SEction 4(a) of that Act.
The sections referred to read:
The object of the corporation shall be:
4(a) with the approval of the President, to establish and conduct any 
industrial undertaking including tourism.
(b) To facilitate, promote, guide and assist in the financing of 
(i) new industries and industrial undertakings including
tourism;
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(ii) Schemes for expansion, better organisation and modernisation 
of the more efficient carrying of operations in existing 
industries and industrial undertaking including tourism.
(IDC Act (Chapter 963))-
Thus this approach, as reflected by the above, does not direct its 
focus on growth, employment creation, equitable distribution and the 
development of an organic technical and material basis for socialist 
development. To the contrary, the establishment of new industries 
Key points* of the economy (as opposed to acquisation of minority 
shares in a diversity of industrial undertakings) create linkages 
(both backward and forward) between the different sectors, create 
employment, constitute the basis for the development of managerial 
and technical skills by local personnel and provide the platform for 
conscious regulation and control of economic levers (prices, level 
of cost of production, effective demand etc.).
In the 1981 IDC annual report the chairman, N Cambitsis had identified 
the fertilizer industry as a key area to establish systematic 
links between industry and agriculture on the one hand and on the other 
hand between the local industry and the SADCC region. Cambitsis 
emphasised that he 'regarded the expansion of fertilizer production
* Key points - These are areas where the influence of investments in 
overcoming obstacles and bottlenecks and in stimulating expansion 
elsewhere is greatest; and in this way the impetus to development 
once launched can be sustained (Dobb, M 1963 page 25).
in Zimbabwe as a priority. The development of crop production in 
the rural areas is dependent upon an ample supply of fertilizer 
inputs at the right time and at the right price. This country 
could become a net exporter of fertilizers as few of our neighbours 
have the combination of suitable deposits and the industrial 
infrastructure necessary to support such an industry' (IDC 1981 
Annual report page 12).
The cement industry which has brought many building projects (from 
individual to provincial and national construction works) to a hault 
in the country shows how the establishment of links 
between sectors (through investing in identified key areas in this 
case by the state) is a potential booster of growth and future 
development. It is clear that the construction industry is a 
potential employer. If such projects of ranked priority are 
'sacrificed for employment presevation (at a certain specific point 
and time) and saving of foreign currency, (both of which are now 
recognised as justified source of laxity and inertia by social actor) 
then the consequences are obvious.
Some of these consequences have been captured in a recent report in The 
Herald: Cement Shortage Forces Chinhoyi rojects to Stop
"Several development projects in the twon of Chinhoyi in Mashonaland 
Vest Province have floundered because of the current shortage of 
cement..... And this has worsened the already bad employment and 
housing problems. Forty-two people lost their jobs when a building
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block folded up because of cement shortage. Many more had already
become unemployed because of the stagnation in the building industry, {
|
while the housing waiting list which currently stands at over 7 000 j
is set to rise as more people move into the provincial capital...
’It was not uncommon, the mayor added, to find the same contractors
selling cement for up to $15 per 50 kg* bag." (The Herald Friday |
January, 6 1989 page 3)- f
... . _>
Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC)
The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation is a post-independence 
creation. It was established under Act No. 31 of 1982 but only 
commenced operations on 5th November 1983 when the act was brought 
into force.
The functions, powers and duties of the corporation are broadly 
stipulated under Section 20 of Act. No. 31, as being total involvement 
in all facets of mining, including promoting mining co-operatives, on 
behalf of the state. (Chairman’s Report 1984 page 3)- This could be 
viewed as an attempt by the state to end the monopoly of private 
capital in the mining sector.
As a new organisation whose primary objective is to ’increase the 
level of mineral production and beneficiation aiming inter alia, at 
increasing the Nation’s capacity to earn and/or save foreign currency'
(Ibid) the ZMDC needed a strategy and framework from which to operate, 
a solid and dynamic manpower base, and a comprehensive investment 
plan/programme. The Chairman's initial efforts were directed towards
* The price in normal circumstances is marked between $3 and $5 per 50 kg bag
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staff recruitment, corporate planning and the development of 
essential managerial control systems, policies and practices. The 
functions, powers, and duties of the corporation were broadly set 
out in the enabling Act,V thus, it was for management to develop and 
recommend to the board of directors a strategic framework within 
which Government's broad investment objectives could be realised. 
S u c h  a framework was heeded in order to provide a sense of direction 
and focus to the corporation's future investment programme. Toward 
this end management recommended and the directors approved a future 
investment programme directed towards the development of Zimbabwe’s 
gold deposits, industrial minerals and the three Ts - tin, tantalite 
and tungsten. The industrial minerals groups is one that has only 
been partially developed in Zimbabwe and its full potential has yet 
to be realised. (1984 Annual Report page 4).
The first financial year (1983-1984) therefore was not necessarily a 
productive year in the sense of production operations^ More 
concentration was placed on the building up of a strong springboard 
for future development, although some investigations into identified 
potential areas were started and the acquisition of,the two 
subsidiaries; Peneast Mining Company (Pvt)-Ltd and Mining Promotion 
Corporation (Pvvt) Ltd. The latter, which has a 100% shareholding 
in Mineral Development (Pvt) Ltd was acquired from the Industrial 
Development Corporation to spear-head the dynamic exploration 
programme to be adopted and maintained by the corporation.
During the (1984-1985) period the corporation moved into acquiring 
mining interests. This was a decisive step towards attaining the 
objectives of the corporation. The strategy and framework, the
exploration and development programme had to be supported by 
productive enterprises.
On 1 November 1984 the Corporation acquired Messina's mining interests 
for an aggregate consideration of Z$5.5 million. At the time 
negotiations were initiated; Governemnt had been asked for financial 
assistance to shore up the loss-making operations particularly at 
Losagundi Smelting and Mining (Private) Ltd (LSM). "It was also 
clear at the time that these operations were not being managed as 
a national asset. Exploration had been abandoned, LSM was on the 
verge of closure and plans f o r  plant modernisation at Jena Mines, a 
gold producer, were not being pursued vigorously. Hence a decision 
was made to acquire Messina’s interests and evolve a development plan 
rather than have government provide the requested financial assistance. 
A plan was submitted to government for financing. (Annual Report 
1985 page 2). Thus ZMDC acquired Messina's interests in':
- MTD (Mangula) Ltd
- LSM (Private) Ltd
- MTD (Sanyafci) Ltd and
- ZMDC Management Service Ltd (Formerly MTD Management Services Ltd
/
The 1985-1986 financial year witnessed the withering away of the 
aggressiveness shown in the previous year by the Corporation, to a 
sober appraisal of the assets which the corporation had at hand. This 
stock taking exercise undoubtedly led to strengthening the group's 
operational capabilities and organisational capacity as indicated by
1J3
by the streamlining of activities in accordance with their specific 
products. Copper mines fall under Mangula Copper Mines Ltd (MCM),
God mines under Sabi Consolidated Gold Mine, and Exploration and 
Development is spearheaded by Mining Promotion Corporation.
It is in this period that the disadvantages and advantages of the 
approach to development by ZMDC sufficed. The chairman's report expressed ^ 
that Mhangura Copper Mines Limited (MCM) realised a net profit of 
$1.8 million a reduction of 17.2% from the previous year. Low metal 
sales due to smelter rebuild, increased inputs costs and frequent 
inherited plant and equipment breakdowns, especially the Load-Haul- 
Dump equipment which accounts for 80% of ore production contributed 
to decline. Most of the equipment has reached its useful life, and
the availability of spare parts is untimely.... . Lomagundi ,
Smelting and Mining (Private) Ltd (LSM) continued to make losses.
Of the $9-5 million originally requested from government in 1984/85 
only $2 million was ms.de available by the Ministry of Finance in the 
1985/86 budget. Ths^ t amount came too late to make a positive impact 
on the company's operations which incured losses of $4.1 million in 
the financial year under review (1986 Annual Report page 3)-
Breakdowns and plants inefficiency were affecting the operations of 
both copper and gold production lines. This means that to increase 
production (and productivity) it required the restructuring of old equipment 
and machinery and equipping them with new and up-to-date machinery.
To do this requires committed financial assistance from the government,
44
which as shown above is not forth-coming. Hence inefficiency and 
untimely availability of spare parts are inevitable.
Regardless of the above disadvantages the ZMDC strategy enabled the 
corporation to consolidate its achievements, establish itself as a 
powerhouse in the mining sector and also develop internal 
managerial capacity. The operations of the corporation are 
streamlined in a systematic way; allowing for easy identification 
of potential areas for growth, establishment of internal linkages, 
which makes it easy to assess the impact of its operations on other 
sectors of the economy.
The systematic link between exploration and development cum exploitation 
of new projects explained the seriousness with which the corporation 
intends to fulfill its stipulated objectives. This combination 
(Exploration and Development cum exploitation of new projects) in 
itself should in future constitute a potential source of growth, 
and employment creation.
This argument can not be complete if the development and importance of 
industrial minerals is explained. The ZMDC acknowledges that the 
industrial minerals group is one that has only been partially developed 
in Zimbabwe and its full potential has yet to be realised (1984 Annual 
Report page 4). It is from the development of this base that the ZMDC 
could effectively contribute to the integral development of the 
economy.
In the case of Zimbabwe mining should assist in initiating industrial 
sector growth, thus diversifying the economic base and leading to a 
balanced economy. In this process, raw materials are made available 
as input materials for the establishment of mineral-related manufacturing 
industries while at the same time demand for services to be provided 
to the mining operations is created. An important objective of mining 
development in this context should then be to promote backward and forward 
linkages.
The greatest benefit of industrial minerals promotion should, however, 
lie in the creation of a fabric of mineral-based industrial activities 
in the form of domestic linkage and multiplier effects. The wide 
spectrum of minerals together with the great variety of occurrences 
and uses also contribute to geographically and sectorally more 
balanced development. (Noetslaller 1987 page 17).
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA)
The Agricultural and Devleopment Authority (ADA) was,constituted 
under the Agricultural and Devleopment Act of 1971 (Chapter 100). In 
1978 Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) was 
established by an amendment to the (ADA)Act of 1971. The main 
functions of the Authority, as prescribed in the Act, was to plan, 
co-ordinate and implement agricutlural and rural development in 
Zimbabwe.
The Agricutlural and Development Act of 1971~(Chapter 100) was" 
substantially amended by the Agricultural and Rural Development
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Authority’s Act (ARDA) 1982. This was also the enabling legislation 
to effectively repeal activities of both the Tribal Trust Land 
Development Corporation and Sabi Limpopo Authority (1983/84 Annual 
Report page 3).
Under this Act the functions and duties of ARDA were set out in Section 
19(2) of the Act as follows:-
(a) To plan, co-ordinate, implement, promote and assist agricultural 
and rural development in Zimbabwe.
(b) To prepare and with the agreement of the Minister of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rural Development to implement schemes for the 
betterment of agriculture or for rural development in any part of 
Zimbabwe.
(c) To plan, promote, co-ordinate and carry out schemes for the 
development, exploitation, utilisation and settlement of state
'land (as specified in the Third Schedule of the Act).
(d) Any other functions and duties which may be imposed upon the 
Authority by any enactment (Ibid).
Close reading of the ARDA Annual Reports (1980-1987) depicts that the 
establishment of state farms was not a priority in order to develop the 
rural economy. Concentration was placed on ’reconstruction, 
rehabilitation and resettlement.' Two subcommittees of the Standing
Committee of ARDA were established. Subcommittee on land acquisition, 
was to advice the government on the most appropriate acquisition of 
commercial land for settlement and resettlement programmes. On the 
other hand the subcommittee on resettlement was responsible for 
initiating and pursuing the resettlement programme.
Since its inception, ARDA's activities evolved around major irrigation 
development schemes and resource surveys. But as a result of the merger 
(1982) and the acquisition by Government on behalf of the Authority of 
three (3) estates the Authority now had thirteen (13) farming estates. 
This move was followed by the formation of the Rural Development 
Promotion Unit within the Agricultural Operations Division to give 
adequate attention to the management of settlement schemes associated 
with the Authority’s core estates, the initiation, planning and 
development of growth points, the identification and development of 
small livestock projects and promotion of tillage units to service 
communal farmers surrounding the core estates (ARDA Annual Report 
1982 page 2).
There seemed to be a change from the strategy of the early years (1980 
and 1981) to develop core state estates as the centre of agricultural 
growth and rural development. But the rate at which this strategy 
was pursued after 1982 shows that even if the need for change had 
been practically urgent different forces militated against this 
approach. From 1982 to 1986 state farms increased at an
annual average of 1.2 estates. Settler outgrower schemes have been 
maintained at seven (7) schemes since the 1983/84 season.
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The low rate of expansion of the land put to state farming is 
reflective of the financial distribution pattern discussed earlier on. 
This pattern puts more emphasis on rural development and not on the 
growth of rural economy and development. The strategy falls within 
the theories which opt for the modernisation of the rural areas. The 
origin of this perspective therefore has to do with the pressing need 
to curtail the rural-urban drift which is characteristic of Zimbabwe. 
But is the solution to this phenomena (supposedly a product of 
contradiction between town and countryside) in the modernisation of 
countryside or in the growth and creation of the countryside socio­
economic opportunities.
To answer the above question the following analysis is presented. The 
solution to the rural-urban drift can be provided by eliminating 
inequalities between the town and rural areas,thare-by fostering 
organic links between the two economies. Once this is acknowledged 
the need to assess the current spatial distribution of productive 
forces arises. In this case spatial organisation should be analysed/ 
assessed in light of the social and'economic relations that conditions 
the current organisational pattern.
It is argued that the social relations shape the spatial organisation 
of the market system and not vice versa. Hence in the long term access; 
to market infrastructure and services is an out come of economic 
opportunities and not the cause. The Market system in this analysis 
refers to the way in which supply-and demand -interact in a particular 
social and historical context to setting of price on commodities and the
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means of production of the commodities. Market infrastructure on the 
other hand refers to how the physical channels of exchange are 
organised on the ground.
If the theoretical explanation given above is anything to go by then 
the development of the rural economy (and therefore uplifting of the 
standards .of life) lies in the creation of economic opportunities, and 
simultaneous transformation of the relations of production in the 
rural setting. But peasant-agricutlure on its on accord cannot create 
such an atmosphere. Many factors militate against the performance 
of peasant agricutlure in this regard. These range from the historical 
development of peasant agricutlure in -Zimbabwe to increased rural 
semi-proletariat, the farming methods, multiplicity of interests (private 
small holdings)- etc.
The expansion and consolidation of State farms (and the development of 
out-grower settler schemes) and the co-operative estates (products of 
the agrarian reform) therefore remain as the means through which the 
social relations and economic opportunities could be enhanced in the 
rural economy in particular./ The role assigned to the state and 
co-operative estates should consist of injecting growth into the 
agricultural sector, to raise productivity, to provide the necessary 
links between industry and agriculture, to develop (proportionally) the 
productive capacity of the rural economy, to encourage production at 
a large-sclae, and transform the social relation of production 
'(consciously shaping agricultural production in general and peasant 
production in particular along socialist principles).
Lenin in a speech (1918) delivered to the Delegates from the poor 
Peasants’ Committees stressed that to transform a vast number of small- 
scale peasant farms, into large scale production is something that 
cannot be done immediately. Agriculture, which hitherto has been 
conducted on individual lines, cannot immediately be socialised and 
transformed into large-scale state enterprises, the products of which 
would be equally and justly distributed among the whole of the working 
people under a system of universal and equal labour service (Lenin,
1971 page 223).
The approach suggested in this section is not aimed at straining relations 
(alliance) between working class and peasantry (the poor and middle 
peasants who constitute the overwhelming majority). This alliance is 
maintained and strengthened through out-grower settler schemes; all 
round'assistance to the peasant sector by the state and co-operative 
estates (e;g. facilitates the acquisition of inputs, provision of 
markets cutting transport costs, technical advice and even tillage 
facilities). Through this approach, its implementation and progress, 
can the peasant be gradually mobilised into large-scale collective 
co-operative production.
It is from this approach that the distribution of land to individual 
peasants should not be regarded as an end in itself as it is 
currently perceived. It is a means to an end: gradual collectivisation 
and therefore socialism. The existence of small-holding or the distribution 
of land to the peasantry’is the socio-economic demand of the time, but 
strategies which lead to and facilitate their gradual collectivisation
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should be constantly worked out and implemented.
Currently with the state farms and co-operative movements' interests 
seemingly at variance not much with regard to 'state-co-operative 
approach' could be expected. On-the one hand the state farms have 
primarily followed, the tradition of large-scale commercial production 
units, both in'working democracy and alliance with private capital.
On the other hand the political and ideological commitment by the 
social actors to the devleopment of collective co-operatives has 
been/is minimal.
Agrarian reform in Zimbabwe has failed to create conditions necessary 
for the devleopment of the pronounced social relations needed to shape. 
the spatial organisation of market system. The failure to generate 
economic opportunities is evidence of continued soubordination (and 
exploitation) of the rural environment by town centres. Government 
confusion on the question of growth and that of socio-economic 
transformation- (especially if it is: intended to realise socialist; 
socio-economic transormation) - is made apparent.
This is so because statements about wooing private investors into rural 
areas are viewed as part of the strategy of realising socialist 
relations of production. For instance, it is claimed that the
Government of Zimbabwe sees the efficient development of .the rural 
areas as the cornerstone to achieving balanced growth to provide 
the basis for socialised development (Rebuilding Zimbabwe page 60).
Conclusion
The argument maintained in this article reflects some of the dilem as 
faced by the Zimbabwean state. The debate is on the establishment of 
a socialist society but traditional capitalist methods or approaches 
a reformulated as ideal tools, to implement allegedly socialist principles 
The result has been stagflation and the solution to this problem 
has been long found in the indiscriminate across the board increases 
in prices. Capitalism is being consolidated in Zimbabwe in the same 
way as socialism is being denied its methodological content.
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